Affective Priming with Pictures of Emotional Scenes: The Role of Perceptual Similarity and Category Relatedness by Calvo, Manuel G. & Avero, Pedro
Prime pictures portraying pleasant or unpleasant scenes were briefly presented (150-ms
display; SOAs of 300 or 800 ms), followed by probe pictures either congruent or
incongruent in emotional valence. In an evaluative decision task, participants responded
whether the probe was emotionally positive or negative. Affective priming was reflected
in shorter response latencies for congruent than for incongruent prime-probe pairs. Although
this effect was enhanced by perceptual similarity between the prime and the probe, it also
occurred for probes that were physically different, and the effect generalized across
semantic categories (animals vs. people). It is concluded that affective priming is a genuine
phenomenon, in that it occurs as a function of stimulus emotional content, in the absence
of both perceptual similarity and semantic category relatedness between the prime and
the probe.
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En un paradigma de activación o priming afectivo, se presentaron pares de fotografías:
primero una como activadora (prime), brevemente (exposición de 150 ms; SOAs de 300
u 800 ms), y a continuación otra como prueba (probe). Las dos fotografías podían ser
congruentes o incongruentes en valencia emocional (agradables vs. desagradables). Los
participantes tenían que responder si la foto de prueba era emocionalmente positiva o
negativa. Se observó un efecto de priming afectivo al producirse latencias de respuesta
más cortas cuando la foto de prueba era congruente en valencia con la foto activadora
que cuando eran incongruentes. Aunque este efecto se incrementó en función de la
semejanza física entre los estímulos de cada par, ocurrió también cuando éstos eran
físicamente diferentes. Además, dicho efecto se generalizó a categorías semánticas
distintas (escenas de animales vs. de personas). Se concluye que el fenómeno de
procesamiento afectivo temprano es genuino, que ocurre en función del contenido
emocional de los estímulos, y en ausencia de semejanza perceptual y de relación
semántica entre el estímulo activador y el de prueba.
Palabras clave: afectivo, activación, fotografías, procesamiento emocional, percepción
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Affective priming involves facilitation of responses to a
probe stimulus following a prime stimulus when both have
the same emotional valence (e.g., pleasant-pleasant), in
comparison with when the prime and the probe differ in
valence (e.g., pleasant-unpleasant). This is a variant of the
more general phenomenon of cognitive priming, in which the
speed or accuracy of a decision to a target is increased when
a previous stimulus is related in meaning or form (e.g., Neely,
1991). Affective priming has been investigated by means of
the affective priming paradigm (see reviews in Fazio, 2001,
and Klauer & Musch, 2003). In a typical study, an emotionally
positive or negative prime word or picture is followed by a
positive or negative probe word or picture on each trial.
Participants are asked to decide whether the probe is positive
or negative in emotional valence, to classify it into an emotional
category, or just to name it. Evidence of priming has been
frequently found for both words and pictures, especially when
the affective evaluation task (i.e., affective decision) has been
used. As priming has appeared following brief presentations
of the prime (typically, around 200 ms), the effect is thought
to reflect automatic processing of emotional valence.
Prior research has examined the affective priming of
emotional pictures by means of two complementary
approaches. First, pictures have served both as primes and
probes (Carroll & Young, 2005: Experiment 2; Hermans, De
Houwer, & Eelen, 1994: Experiment 1; Hermans, Spruyt,
De Houwer, & Eelen, 2003: Experiment 1; Hietanen &
Korpela, 2004; Spruyt, Hermans, De Houwer, & Eelen, 2002:
Experiments 1, 2 and 3; Spruyt, Hermans, De Houwer, &
Eelen, 2004; Storbeck & Robinson, 2004: Experiment 5).
Second, pictures have been used as primes and printed words
(or vocal expressions; Korpela, Klemettilä, & Hietanen, 2002)
as probes (Banse, 2001: Experiments 1 and 2; Carroll &
Young, 2005: Experiments 1 and 4; Giner-Sorolla, García,
& Bargh, 1999: Experiments 1 and 2; Hermans, Baeyens,
Lamote, Spruyt, & Eelen, 2005; Hermans, Spruyt, De
Houwer, et al., 2003: Experiments 2 and 3; Hermans, Spruyt,
& Eelen, 2003; Hermans, Vansteenwegen, Crombez, Baeyens,
& Eelen, 2002; Spruyt et al., 2002: Experiment 3; Storbeck
& Robinson, 2004: Experiment 4). In spite of the considerable
methodological variability across these studies (e.g., the
nature of prime and probe stimuli: e.g., scenes vs. facial
expressions vs. objects; or the probe task: naming vs.
evaluative decision vs. emotion classification), generally
facilitation has been found in the processing of congruent
(or related) versus incongruent (or unrelated) prime-probe
sequences, with the notable exception of Storbeck and
Robinson (2004). This makes affective priming with pictures
as primes a relatively robust phenomenon.
The present study attempts to make a contribution to prior
research on affective priming with pictures by investigating
the nature of the representation that is extracted from the prime
stimulus. More specifically, we aim to determine whether
genuine affective content is automatically obtained from the
prime, and whether it is this affective content that determines
the facilitation of the response to the probe. Storbeck and
Robinson (2004) have pointed out that there are nonaffective
processes, such as perceptual identification and semantic
categorization, that can also occur automatically and that might
be involved in the effects attributed to affective priming. It is,
therefore, important to separate the relative contribution of
three dimensions: affective, semantic, and perceptual. In this
context, our approach is relevant to two important issues. First,
whether processing of emotional content per se is responsible
for the observed affective priming effects, or whether these
could be due to the physical similarity or semantic category
relatedness between primes and probes, that is, the possibility
of a greater similarity or relatedness between primes and probes
of the same emotional valence than between primes and probes
of different valence. And, second, this is relevant to the issue
of whether affective processing occurs earlier, in parallel to,
or follows perceptual and semantic processing. Recent views
of emotional processing (Cave & Batty, in press; Storbeck,
Robinson, & McCourt, in press) have challenged the primacy-
of-affect idea (Bargh, 1997; Zajonc, 2000). According to these
views, objects must first be identified perceptually and
semantically before their affective content can be extracted.
This implies that affective processing starts later and is
dependent on perceptual and semantic processing.
The issue of the role of prime-probe perceptual similarity
in affective priming has not been directly addressed in prior
research. In most studies, a limited number of different primes
and probes have been used (generally, 16 or fewer different
pictures of positive and of negative valence; e.g., Carroll &
Young, 2005; Hietanen & Korpela, 2004; Spruyt et al., 2002)
in repeated trials. To examine this issue, an ideal condition
would require a great deal of variation in the physical
appearance of primes and probes, and no repetition. In the
current experiments, we have used 32 pleasant and 32
unpleasant different pictures, and they were presented only
once as primes and probes, to avoid pre-exposure and practice
effects. Furthermore, a specific approach to determine the
extent to which affective priming depends on physical
appearance would involve manipulation of the degree of
perceptual similarity within and across emotional valence.
Some prior studies have provided support to the idea that
physical similarity between the prime and the probe is not
required, as priming has appeared when the primes were
pictures and the probes were words (hence, physically
different; e.g., Carroll & Young, 2005; Hermans, Spruyt, &
Eelen, 2003). In an alternative approach, with pictorial stimuli
as both primes and probes, we have addressed this first issue
in Experiment 1, in which the perceptual similarity (identical
vs. reversed vs. different) of affectively congruent and
incongruent prime-probe sequences was varied. Affective
priming was predicted to survive differences in physical
appearance between the prime and the probe, although
priming should be enhanced by the degree of perceptual
similarity. This would reveal that the affective content of the
prime is processed, but that emotional processing does not
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precede perceptual processing. See more specific predictions
and arguments in the introduction to Experiment 1.
Regarding the issue of the role of prime-probe semantic
category relatedness in affective priming, prior research has
provided inconclusive results. Storbeck and Robinson (2004)
found semantic category priming, but not affective priming.
More specifically, two types of valenced pictures of animals
of different semantic categories were presented (pleasant:
rabbit, puppy, swan, and sparrow; and unpleasant: snake,
spider, porcupine, and raven). There were priming effects
when the probes matched the primes in both valence and
category, but not when there was only valence matching.
According to the authors, these findings are inconsistent with
the idea that emotional processing (i.e., valence distinctions)
is performed before a relatively refined semantic analysis. In
contrast, other studies suggest that an affective representation
is obtained from the prime and then determines affective
priming on semantically different probes. This can be inferred
from recent experiments (Carroll & Young, 2005, Experiment
2) in which there was priming as a function of prime-probe
congruence in emotional valence, even though the primes and
the probes were categorically different (i.e., primes: scenes
depicting people and animals; and probes: human facial
expressions of emotion). Nevertheless, the relative contribution
of semantic category processing and affective processing
cannot be totally separated in the Carroll and Young study.
The reason is that the valence and the semantic category of
the primes were not orthogonally combined. In order to
determine whether there is affective priming across different
semantic categories, in our Experiment 2, we combined the
semantic category (people vs. animals) and valence (pleasant
vs. unpleasant) of the primes. If affective content is extracted
from the primes, it should influence evaluative decisions on
the affectively congruent probes, regardless of differences
between the prime and the probe in specific semantic content
and category. See more specific predictions and arguments
in the introduction to Experiment 2.
Experiment 1
Unpleasant or pleasant prime pictures were presented
for 150 ms, followed by congruent or incongruent probes,
in a 300- or an 800-ms stimulus onset asynchrony (SOA).
The 150-ms prime exposure was chosen, rather than the
more usual 200-ms display (e.g., Hermans, Spruyt, & Eelen,
2003) because minimal saccade latency is 150 ms (see
Rayner, 1998). This implies that viewing of the prime
stimulus in the current study was restricted to a single eye
fixation. Participants performed an affective decision task
on the probe, by responding whether it was positive or
negative. The difference in response latencies between
congruent and incongruent probes was used as an index of
affective priming. If the affective content of the prime is
processed, then correct evaluative decisions on the probe
will be faster when the prime and the probe are congruent
than when these are incongruent in emotional valence.
The specific aim of Experiment 1 was to assess the degree
to which affective priming depends on physical similarity
between the prime and the probe. This is relevant to the issue
of the extent to which affective processing precedes, is parallel,
or follows perceptual identification of the prime. To address
this issue, the physical similarity (identical vs. reversed in
left-right orientation vs. different) between primes and probes
was varied, while the emotional valence was constant. It
should, nevertheless, be noted that affective congruence and
perceptual similarity were not orthogonally combined, due
to the impossibility of producing a prime and a probe that
are incongruent affectively while being physically identical
or reversed. Accordingly, affective congruence versus
incongruence was manipulated only for the physically different
condition. If affective processing is independent from, or
precedes, perceptual identification, then not only will affective
priming emerge when the congruent prime and probe are
physically different, but also affective priming will be similar
in the different and the reversed, and possibly the identical,
conditions. In contrast, to the extent that affective priming
increases as a function of physical similarity, this would reveal
that emotional processing depends on perceptual identification.
Method
Participants
Forty-eight psychology undergraduates (37 females; 11
males) at La Laguna University participated for course credit. 
Stimuli
Sixty-four different experimental pictures were presented,
which portrayed people either in unpleasant (32) or pleasant
(32) scenes. All the pictures were presented either in their
original spatial orientation or horizontally reversed, as a
mirror image, in different combinations (see Design). The
original pictures were selected from the International Affective
Picture System (IAPS; Center for the Study of Emotion and
Attention, 1999). The IAPS numbers are indicated in the
Appendix. The mean IAPS valence scores of the selected
stimuli in undergraduate Spanish samples (Moltó et al., 1999;
Vila et al., 2001) are 2.32 (unpleasant) and 7.71 (pleasant),
on a 9-point scale, t(62) = 35.18, p < .0001. 
Both in Experiment 1 and 2, each picture was presented
only once as a prime and once as a probe to each participant,
to avoid practice effects. Each picture subtended a visual angle
of 12.1° (width: 11.7 cm) by 10.1° (height: 9.7 cm), at a 55-
cm viewing distance. Participants had their head positioned
on a chin and forehead rest. All pictures were presented in
their original colors against a dark background. The pictures
were displayed on a SVGA 17” monitor with a 100-Hz refresh
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rate, at a resolution of 800 × 600 pixels, connected to a
Pentium-IV computer. The E-Prime experimental software
(Schneider, Eschman, & Zuccolotto, 2002) controlled stimulus
presentation and response collection. Response accuracy and
latency were collected through key presses on specified keys.
For half of the participants in each experimental condition,
the “positive” response key was D and the “negative” key was
L, in a standard computer keyboard, whereas the reverse
applied to the other half of the participants. 
Procedure
The participants were informed that they would be
presented with a sequence of two photographs on each trial,
in the center of the screen, that their task was to respond as
soon as possible whether the second photograph was positive
or negative in emotional valence, and that both accuracy and
reaction times would be collected. No mention was made of
the relationship between the first (prime) and the second (probe)
picture, and participants were not asked to attend or to ignore
the prime. They were simply told that the prime would appear
very quickly and that nothing had to be done about it. A trial
started with a central cross as a fixation point for 500 ms,
followed by the prime stimulus for 150 ms, a blank 150- or
650-ms interval (hence SOAs of 300 or 800 ms), and the probe
stimulus, which remained on the screen until the participant
responded or for 2 seconds. The inter-trial interval was 3 s. 
Design
A mixed factorial design involved the combination of
two within-subjects factors: prime-probe relatedness (identical
vs. reversed vs. congruent vs. incongruent), and valence of
the probe (unpleasant vs. pleasant); with a between-subjects
factor: SOA (300 vs. 800 ms). At each SOA, for the 32
pleasant-people probes, each participant was presented with
8 identical primes, 8 reversed primes, 8 pleasant (but different
in form) primes, and 8 unpleasant (and different in form)
primes; the same applied to the 32 unpleasant-people probes.
In the identical condition, the prime and the probe stimulus
were exactly the same in all respects. In the reversed
condition, the horizontal orientation of the prime picture was
mirror-reversed from left to right with respect to the same
probe picture. There were 24 participants at each SOA level.
All trials were presented in random order for each participant.
Results and Discussion
Both for Experiments 1 and 2, reaction times in the valence
evaluation task that were above 1,500 ms or below 300 ms
were removed (1.3%), to deal with outliers. In addition, reaction
times that were 2.5 standard deviations (SD) above or below
the mean were replaced by the ± 2.5 SD values in each
experiment, separately. This represented 2.8% of cases across
experiments. Analyses of variance were conducted for accuracy
and reaction times for correct responses. Accuracy was high
in all the experiments (3.8% total errors and misses) and did
not differ across conditions (or experiments). Accordingly,
subsequent analyses were conducted only on the correct reaction
times. The alpha level was set at .05 for all analyses. Unless
otherwise indicated, nonsignificant effects will not be reported.
The 2 (valence of probe) × 4 (prime-probe relatedness) ×
2 (SOA) ANOVA revealed a strong effect of relatedness, F(3,
138) = 42.60, p < .0001, ηp2 = .48. Post hoc multiple
comparisons, with alpha level adjusted by Bonferroni
corrections, showed significant differences (ps < .01) between
all relatedness levels: identical (M = 608 ms; SD = 138),
reversed (M = 663 ms; SD = 150), congruent (M = 739 ms;
SD = 174), and incongruent M = 793 ms; SD = 181). There
was also a borderline relatedness by SOA interaction, F(3,
138) = 2.70, p = .05, ηp2 = .16 (see Figure 1). To decompose
this interaction, simple effect tests were performed for each
SOA condition. In the 300-ms SOA condition, there was a
main effect of relatedness, F(3, 69) = 25.85, p < .0001, ηp2
= .53, with significant differences between all levels in post
hoc comparisons (ps < .05). In the 800-ms SOA condition,
there was also a main effect of relatedness, F(3, 69) = 17.57,
p < .0001, ηp2 = .43. However, in this case, post hoc
comparisons revealed significant differences (all ps < .05) only
between the two physically related conditions (i.e., identical
and reversed) and the two physically different conditions (i.e.,
congruent and incongruent), with no significant differences
between the identical and the reversed probes, or between the
congruent and the incongruent probes. Accordingly, both for
affective congruence and for physical relatedness, the effects
decreased at the longer SOA, in comparison with the shorter
SOA. This tendency was further examined in Experiment 2,
by combining the results of both experiments for the conditions
of most interest, that is, congruent and incongruent.
Figure 1. Mean reaction times as a function of affective prime-
probe congruence and physical prime-probe relatedness, and SOA
(Experiment 1). 
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Correct responses were faster when probes were
congruent with primes in emotional valence than when they
were incongruent. This is consistent with most prior studies
using pictorial stimuli (e.g., Carroll & Young, 2005; Hermans
et al., 1994; Hietanen & Korpela, 2004; Spruyt et al., 2002),
and suggests that affective content is extracted from the
prime and that this content determines the observed priming
effects. The specific finding of this experiment reveals that
perceptual processing precedes affective processing. This is
inferred from the fact that reaction times on the affective
evaluation task were shorter as physical similarity increased
between the prime and the probe. That is, affective priming
progressively increased from the different versus reversed
versus identical prime-probe pairs, even though there was
equivalent congruence in affective valence in all three
conditions. However, although physical similarity enhances
affective priming (i.e., identical vs. reversed, where affective
content was exactly the same), physical similarity is not
necessary for affective priming. This is inferred from the
fact that affective priming occurred even when primes and
probes were physically different, provided that they were
congruent in affect (i.e., congruent vs. incongruent condition).
Finally, it is interesting to note that the effect of valence
was not significant, nor did congruence interact with valence,
which reveals that affective priming is equivalent for both
pleasant and unpleasant stimuli. 
The results of Experiment 1 have shown that affective
priming occurs to a significant extent as a function of
congruence in affective content, although it is enhanced by
physical similarity. There is, however, the question of the
contribution of semantic relatedness. According to Storbeck
and Robinson (2004), there is the possibility of a confound
of affective with nonaffective priming due to semantic
category relatedness between primes and probes. This issue
is relevant here because in Experiment 1, both the primes
and the probes always belonged to the same category (i.e.,
people). This potential confound also applies to some of the
picture-word studies (e.g., Carroll & Young, 2005, Experiments
1 and 4), in which the prime and the probe, though physically
different, generally represented the same object, and so there
was semantic relatedness. Accordingly, it is possible that the
prime stimulus primed the congruent probe stimulus because
of semantic category relatedness, rather than because of
affective congruence. To address this issue, we conducted
Experiment 2, in which the priming effects of pictures of two
different categories, i.e., animals and people, were compared.
Experiment 2
Primes and probes were combined across stimulus
category (pictures of people and animals, instead of only
people), to examine generalization effects. If affective content
is extracted from an emotional prime (and not only semantic
category information) then this will facilitate processing of
an emotionally congruent probe, regardless of semantic
category. That is, animal and people prime pictures are
expected to prime affective responses on people probe
pictures similarly, provided that primes and probes share the
same affective valence. Alternatively, if semantic and affective
priming interact, the amount of priming will be greater when
the primes and the probes match in both category membership
and affective valence (e.g., both pleasant people or both
unpleasant people) than when they match only in valence
(e.g., pleasant animal and pleasant people).
Method
Participants
Forty-eight psychology undergraduates (38 females, 10
males) at La Laguna University participated for course credit.
The samples of participants were different for Experiments
1 and 2, although they were drawn from the same pool of
first-year students (ranging in age from 19 to 22; M = 19.9),
and were assigned randomly, in order to make comparisons
across the experiments.
Stimuli
Eighty pictures were presented. They were either
unpleasant (32 portrayed people, 8 portrayed animals) or
pleasant (32, people; 8, animals). In addition to those used
in Experiment 1, 16 new photographs of animals were used,
14 of which were obtained from the IAPS (see the
Appendix). For the animal pictures, the mean valence scores
were 3.38 (unpleasant) and 7.95 (pleasant), on a 9-point
scale, t(14) = 38.70, p < .0001. 
Apparatus, Procedure, and Design 
These were the same as in Experiment 1, except for the
design. Prime category (people vs. animal) was added as a
new within-subjects factor, which was combined with probe
valence (unpleasant vs. pleasant), and prime-probe congruence
(congruent vs. neutral vs. incongruent), and the between-
subjects SOA factor (300 vs. 800 ms; 24 subjects at each
level). At each SOA, for the 32 pleasant-people probes, each
participant was presented with a different combination of 8
pleasant-people primes, 8 unpleasant-people primes, 8
pleasant-animal primes, and 8 unpleasant-animal primes; the
same applied to the 32 unpleasant-people probes. 
Results and Discussion
The 2 (prime category) × 2 (valence of probe) × 2
(prime-probe congruence) × 2 (SOA) ANOVA revealed only
a strong effect of congruence on correct-response times,
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F(1, 46) = 17.15, p < .0001, ηp2 = .27, with faster responses
for congruent (M = 718 ms; SD = 174) than for incongruent
(M = 763 ms; SD = 181) probes. That affective priming was
reliable both within the same category and across categories
was confirmed by significant effects of congruence for the
person-prime/person-probe condition, F(1, 46) = 10.57, p
< .01, ηp2 = .19, and for the animal-prime/person-probe
condition, F(1, 46) = 4.99, p < .05, ηp2 = .10, separately
(see mean scores in Figure 2). 
Although the time course of affective priming was not
of specific interest in the current study, this topic has been
relevant in prior research. To examine this issue, we combined
the data from Experiments 1 and 2 for those conditions that
were comparable (i.e., congruent and incongruent conditions
in which people scenes were depicted), in a 2 (valence of
probe) × 2 (prime-probe congruence) × 2 (SOA) × 2
(Experiment). In addition to a significant effect of congruence,
F(1, 92) = 21.90, p < .0001, ηp2 = .19, a congruence by
SOA interaction emerged, F(1, 92) = 4.98, p < .05, ηp2 =
.05 (see Figure 3). This interaction was decomposed by means
of a posteriori contrasts aimed at comparing the congruent
and the incongruent probes for each SOA condition. Type I
error was controlled for multiple comparisons (and it was
set at .025, for two comparisons). In the 300-ms SOA
condition, congruent probes were responded to faster than
incongruent probes, t(47) = 4.30, p < .001. In contrast, in
the 800-ms SOA condition, differences did not reach the
statistical significance level, t(47) = 2.12, p = .039, ns.
Accordingly, the interaction comes from the fact that there
was significant facilitation for congruent probes only at the
shortest SOA, which suggests that the affective priming effect
is short-lived (see the General Discussion).
The specific finding of Experiment 2 indicated that there
was generalization of priming across different semantic
categories (people and animals). Furthermore, affective priming
was not enhanced by category relatedness, as there was no
interaction. This implies that the underlying affective content
(beyond differences in semantic category) was extracted from
the prime and then influenced the processing of the probe.
In contrast, with narrow semantic categories (i.e., types of
animals), Storbeck and Robinson (2004) found category
priming effects (i.e., facilitation or interference as a function
of category match or mismatch between prime and probe,
regardless of prime-probe affective matching), but not affective
priming. It is, however, possible that participants in the
Storbeck and Robinson study were biased towards using
semantic categorization in preference to affective processing
due to their categories being narrow and specific (dogs, rabbits,
snakes, and spiders), and therefore very salient and easy to
be used as processing guides. If so, affective processing might
be overridden when there are very salient cues (such as
perceptual features associated with specific object categories)
that make the stimuli clearly similar or different in specific
nonemotional information, on the basis of which individuals
can make discrimination and decisions easily. With broader
semantic categories and perceptual variability than Storbeck
and Robinson, we have found affective priming. Our results
are consistent with those of Carroll and Young (2005;
Experiment 2), who found affective priming from scenes of
people and animals, as primes, to human emotional facial
expressions, as probes, although category was not
systematically manipulated in their study.
General Discussion
A general finding in these experiments revealed affective
priming for emotional visual scenes: There were shorter
latencies for probes when these were congruent in affective
valence with a prime than when they were incongruent. Of
special importance, there were two major findings related
Figure 2. Mean reaction times as a function of prime-probe
affective congruence, category of prime (people or animals; the
probe always depicted people), and SOA (Experiment 2). 
Figure 3. Mean reaction times for pictures portraying people scenes
across Experiments 1 and 2, as a function of prime-probe affective
congruence and SOA. 
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to the aims of this study, and one additional finding regarding
the time course of affective priming. First, affective priming
occurred even when the primes and the probes were very
different in physical appearance, although the effect was
enhanced as a function of prime-probe physical similarity
(identical vs. reversed vs. different). Second, affective
priming was reliable not only within the same semantic
category, but also across different object categories (people
vs. animals). And, third, affective priming emerged early
(300 ms after the prime onset) and decreased over time (800
ms), although this was reflected in shorter response latencies
for incongruent probes rather than in changes for the
congruent probes. 
Is affective content extracted from the prime, and what
kind of representation is responsible for the affective priming
effect? Presumably, a meaningful impression is obtained very
quickly from the prime, involving information about the
emotional valence of the stimulus as good or bad. Affective
priming occurred even when there were considerable
differences in physical appearance and also differences in
semantic category between the prime and the probe. This
suggests that the priming effect was not produced simply by
perceptual or semantic relatedness. Rather, some kind of
nonperceptual and nonsemantic information must have also
been obtained from the prime, which then speeded up the
identification of the probe when it was of the same emotional
valence, in comparison with when it was of different valence,
regardless of physical and category differences. 
The hypothesis that such a nonperceptual affective
representation is responsible for affective priming is also
supported by prior findings that have shown transfer from
primes to probes of a different nature. Thus, affective
priming has been found for pictures as primes and written
or spoken words as probes (hence, physically different),
which were, otherwise, congruent or incongruent in
emotional valence (Banse, 2001; Carroll & Young, 2005;
Hermans et al., 2005; Hermans, Spruyt, De Houwer, et al.,
2003; Hermans, Spruyt, & Eelen, 2003; Hermans et al.,
2002; Korpela et al., 2002; Spruyt et al., 2002). This does
not deny the fact that some perceptual analysis is required
and that perceptual similarity enhances affective priming.
Rather, this generalization of priming across different sensory
modalities and cognitive representation formats is consistent
with the idea that the underlying affective content is
processed and responsible for the priming effects.
The hypothesis that affective processing is not semantic
either, or does not require semantic analysis, probably
depends on how semantic content is defined. The affective
representation is meaningful in that it involves evaluation
of stimuli as positive or negative. However, it is not semantic
in a more strict sense, such as category identification, which
requires more refined analysis of specific information of
stimuli. The fact that Storbeck and Robinson (2004) found
category priming, but not affective priming, led these authors
to conclude that semantic analysis occurs before (and is
probably necessary for) affective evaluation. We have already
argued that this category preference was probably biased
by the use of very specific categories, with very salient
perceptual cues to be discriminated. Consistent with this
view is the fact that Storbeck and Robinson did find affective
priming in their Experiment 3 (with words as stimuli, rather
than pictures), when all stimuli came from a single semantic
category. These authors then admitted that affective priming
may be more likely when semantic variations are minimal. 
The time course of affective priming with pictures is not
directly relevant to the specific aims of this study, although
our findings add to prior research in two respects. First, the
current study has shown that affective processing is activated
early and quickly (300-ms SOA and a 150-ms prime display)
the first (and only) time that the stimuli are presented. This
confirms that the affective priming effects found in prior
studies that used similar short SOAs and prime displays—
albeit repeated presentations of stimuli across trials—(Hermans
et al., 1994; Hermans, Spruyt, & Eelen, 2003; Hietanen &
Korpela, 2004; Korpela et al., 2002) reflected a genuine fast-
activated process, not contaminated by pre-exposure. This is
precisely what can be expected if affective processing is
automatic (see Bargh, 1994). Second, some authors have
proposed that the activation of affective content is short-lived,
as priming occurs at short SOAs (300 ms or less) and
disappears at longer SOAs (1,000 ms; Hermans et al., 1994;
Hermans, Spruyt & Eelen, 2003). However, affective priming
has sometimes been detected at 1,000- and 1,200-ms SOAs
(Hietanen & Korpela, 2004; Korpela et al., 2002), and 750-
and 2,000-ms SOAs (Carroll & Young, 2005). The findings
from the current study support the view that affective priming
is greatest at short delays (300-ms SOA), and declines or
disappears at longer delays (800-ms SOA). 
In conclusion, there is early processing of the affective
content of pictorial stimuli that portray pleasant or unpleasant
scenes. Discrimination between scenes occurs as a function
of their differences in affective content, beyond and above
differences in perceptual characteristics and semantic
categories. Nevertheless, physical similarity facilitates
processing of affective content, whereas category relatedness
does not. Our data demonstrate that affective priming occurs
early and despite variations in perceptual and semantic
differences between a prime and a probe. This implies that
affective processing can develop in parallel to detailed
perceptual analysis and refined semantic analysis of the
prime stimulus, to some extent. This does not imply,
however, that affective processing precedes (or starts before)
cognitive processing. The fact that physical prime-probe
similarity speeds up affective priming suggests that some
prior perceptual and semantic information (although not
necessarily category information) must be obtained prior to
initiating affective assessment. This is consistent with
Storbeck et al.’s (in press) proposal that the features of
objects must be integrated and that these must be identified
prior to affective analysis. 
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AFFECTIVE PRIMING WITH PICTURES 17
IAPS Number of Pictures Used as Positive and Negative Primes and Probes in Experiments 1 and 2. 
Positive (People): 2000, 2040, 2057, 2058, 2070, 2092, 2160, 2165, 2311, 2332, 2340, 2341, 2352, 2360, 2395, 2540,
2550, 4574, 4599, 4624, 4641, 4643, 4653, 4660, 4680, 4687, 4694, 4700, 7325, 8461, 8490, 8499.
Positive (Animals): 1440, 1441, 1463, 1710, 1750, 1920, pa9 (non-IAPS), pa10 (non-IAPS).
Negative (People): 2120, 2683, 2691, 2703, 2799, 2800, 2900, 3022, 3030, 3180, 3181, 3350, 3530, 3550, 6250, 6313,
6510, 6550, 6560, 8231, 9040, 9230, 9250, 9253, 9254, 9410, 9421, 9429, 9440, 9490, 9594, 9921.
Negative (Animals): 1050, 1205, 1300, 1525, 1726, 1930, na2 (non-IAPS), na9 (non-IAPS).
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